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Abstract: 
 Throughout the past ten years, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has issued hundreds of enforcement actions in the electric, natural gas, and petroleum industries.  
The vast majority of these citations have been violations of environmental statutes, notably the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).  My research evaluates the timing of 
informed investors’ actions pertaining to the public release of these EPA announcements.  Since 
informed traders have much more leverage in the options market, there seems likely to be a 
concentration of abnormal put option activity shortly before the time in which the 
announcements reach the public.  My sample includes energy companies that were cited by the 
EPA from 2008 to 2014. In particular, I test whether there is a heightened level of abnormal 
short-sale and options trading activity prior to these announcements.  I find moderate evidence of 
informed trading in the options market, but no such evidence in the equity market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macksoud 3 
 
Introduction 
 Insider trading allows a number of investors to benefit from privileged information before 
it reaches the market.  Tracking such behavior is important because the trustworthiness of the 
marketplace is of paramount concern to lawmakers.  Additionally, it is difficult to quantitatively 
trace this type of behavior.  Since this activity is illegal in the United States, methods of tracking 
such trading tendencies can be useful to SEC regulators in order to level the playing field.  The 
key to measuring insider trading is to determine when the announcement was released to the 
public and then observe trading activity before, during, and after disclosure of information.  
Thus, I am able to determine whether there is an abnormal level of trading activity in the electric, 
natural gas, and petroleum industries from 2008 to 2014.  As such, I incorporate event studies 
utilized by researchers in studies of other industries to determine such a relationship.   
 In the energy industry, all firms are regulated by the EPA.  Therefore, I use citations 
published by the EPA for the violation of federal environmental statutes in order to standardize 
my results.  In about a third of the cases, the pertinent information in the EPA announcement is 
released prior to such date via an alternative news publication.  I create one model for equity 
market activity and another one for options market trading activity.  My models take into account 
the earlier leakages of information in the press in order to determine when insider trading was to 
occur, if any.  As a result, I use the initial release of material information to test whether a certain 
group of individuals having access to such information has an effect on prior short interest and 
put option activity.   
 In the options market model, there is modest evidence of insider trading prior to EPA or 
related news announcements.  However, most of the individual terms in the model prove to be 
statistically insignificant.  In the equity market model, there is no evidence of insider trading 
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prior to the announcements and most independent variables tested for are statistically 
insignificant.  The low R-squares for each model suggests that the independent variables chosen 
below do not accurately depict evidence of insider trading prior to such announcements.   
Insider Trading 
 In the United States, insider trading is defined as having privileged access to material, 
nonpublic information about a corporation and acting based upon such knowledge in the market 
(Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 2010).  Since insider trading is illegal in the United States, its 
presence in the financial markets is problematic for the government.  Many authors have 
performed event studies in the past that tried to predict and measure patterns of insider trading.  
However, this type of illegal investment activity does not occur haphazardly throughout the 
equity and options markets.  Many authors contend that there is a strong presence in the trading 
patterns of stocks and options prior to major events that indicate insider trading.  We believe this 
pattern can be applied to EPA citations involving energy companies.  The viewpoints of insider 
trading in different industries and scenarios will be illustrated in more detail below. 
Informed vs. Insider Trading 
 First, it is necessary to distinguish between insider trading and informed trading.  The 
former is easier to describe as it is a product of conventional wisdom: acting upon privileged 
access to information before the market has it.  This activity is primarily conducted in either the 
equity market or the options market, to be described in detail in the paragraphs below.  
Additionally, insider trading could occur with certain commodities and future contracts as well, 
but for the purpose of my analysis, I will be focused on the equity and options markets.  Holders 
of this private, insider information can exercise these transactions on their own or provide tips to 
other individuals/institutions.  In response to technological improvements on a nation-wide scale, 
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the SEC has created a number of algorithms in an attempt to detect these illicit activities in real-
time to try to uncover such investors (SEC).   
 Informed trading involves actors making decisions based on the best available 
information.  This strategy is best described through an analogy contrasting an average 
individual investor to a division within a large mutual fund.  After doing a minimal amount of 
internet surfing and glancing at a few graphs, the former decides to purchase 200 shares of Coca-
Cola based upon barely more than a few positive news articles.  On the other hand, the large 
mutual fund has thousands of employees that have been gathering information about the 
beverage industry for decades, even since before Coca-Cola was made public.  Furthermore, this 
mutual fund has access to nearly every financial news publication, and has dozens of analysts 
who follow Coca-Cola religiously since the company is a part of their individual portfolios.  In 
other words, the mutual fund has a cheaper average cost of information than the individual 
investor and thus is able to make much more informed investment decisions.  In addition, since 
the fund has access to a higher level of capital, the mutual fund can spread out its funds more 
efficiently in well diversified portfolios.  The mutual fund ‘knows’ whether to invest in Coca-
Cola at this time, to short the company’s stock, or simply to abstain from purchasing shares of 
Coca-Cola.  This is a prime example of how a sub-sect of the mutual fund is the much more 
informed party when compared to an average individual investor as the latter has neither the time 
nor resources to evaluate all of the fundamental/technical information available to the public.  
Yet, in the above example, the mutual fund is using informed – not insider – trading to its 
advantage and naturally exploiting those who are less informed.   
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Risk Assessment 
 Upon discovering and trading upon privileged information before it becomes public, this 
action affects the risk aversion of other investors through the change in market expectations.  
Access to privileged information – whether as an informed or insider investor – allows this entity 
to seek relatively riskier investment choices because the corresponding risk-reward relationship 
is better than that of a less risky investment.  As such, asymmetric levels of information via 
informed or insider trading can lead to high abnormal returns utilizing various trading strategies: 
short-sales and put options (Easley et al. 1998).  If informational imbalances prior to EPA 
announcements cause abnormal levels of trading to occur during this time period, high abnormal 
returns will be realized after the information is released.   
 On a rudimentary level, Miller (1977) argues that risk-averse investors would take the 
short position less frequently than the long one because of the inherent risk of the former.  The 
long position allows for potentially unlimited returns with potential losses amounting to zero if 
the company went bankrupt.  However, Miller claims that taking the short position enables 
potentially unlimited losses if the stock price continues to increase while gaining only the then-
current share price if the company were to become completely insolvent.  Finally, he concludes 
that investors holding privileged information make up a much greater proportion of the short-sale 
market since from their perspectives, there isn’t as much relative risk in the investment when 
compared to others. As such, this is the primary reason why the short side of the equity market 
generally attracts more informed traders who may have greater access to information.  In relation 
to EPA announcements, the informational imbalances described above distort the market 
efficiency for both the equity and options markets.  As such, the level of risk aversion by 
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uninformed investors is affected by informed investors assuming that the actions taken by the 
latter cause an artificial shift in the market price before the information become public.   
 Additionally, there is the question of whether traders engaging in transactions prior to 
announcements are informed or simply speculating on future returns.  Referring specifically to 
unexpected analyst recommendations (to be discussed in more detail below), Blau and Wade 
(2012) finds that a nearly symmetric relationship exists between call and put option activity prior 
to an analyst upgrade or downgrade.  As such, Blau and Wade shows that during the pre-
recommendation period, short-sellers are not unusually informed about the direction of the 
upcoming recommendation changes.  Therefore, determining net changes in call and put option 
volume are vital for a holistic analysis on option market operations and subsequent reactions to 
EPA citations, even though it only publish negative information in my analysis.   
 Since options and derivatives are relatively new in the marketplace, short-sales were the 
only mechanism widely available to predict a decrease in a firm’s market value until the late 
1970’s.  Oversight over the short side of the equity market changed significantly after the 2008 
financial crisis.  In years preceding the housing crash, Dong and Sinha (2012) claim that a few 
investors speculated that a negative downturn was imminent.  They contend that this is reflective 
of the large proportion of short to long positions of the 30 firms within the DJIA from 2003-
2008.  As such, Dong and Sinha note that after the SEC regulations were authorized, there was a 
notable shift of informed investors from the equity to options market1.  The 2008 U.S. housing 
crisis caused the SEC to keep a closer eye on the stock market, which subsequently caused 
                                                          
1 In 2008, the SEC further prohibited the practice of naked short-selling, which is to short a stock without having a 
certain level of the long position of such shares (Tanenbaum et. al.).  Prior to 2008, it was customary for investors 
to deliberately misrepresent to broker dealers about their intentions to sell short as well as possessing the proper 
ratio of short to long shares in the first place. 
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severe restrictions on the daily volume of short-sales.  This change caused a higher percentage of 
informed investors to shift from the equity to the options market.   
 Because of such regulations, Easley et. al. (1998) claim that transactions in the 
derivatives market represent the most important predictor of security price movement.  
Furthermore, they also contend that short-term puts best represent the actions of informed trading 
ahead of negative news in order to capitalize on a higher likelihood of future negative returns.  In 
comparison to shorting stocks, purchasing options is significantly more practical to traders 
relying upon instantaneous market reactions in order to maximize profits.  This is due to the 
nature of how options are purchased and exercised, which will be discussed in the theory section 
below.   
Family vs. Non-Family Owned Firms 
 Insider trading has many reasons for execution in the market.  Anderson et. al. (2012) 
argue that the degree of family ownership plays a vital role in abnormal levels of trading prior to 
earnings announcements.  Thus, Anderson et. al. empirically test whether family-controlled 
firms show heightened evidence of insider trading than those owned by multiple families or by 
the public at large.  They utilize data for 2,000 firms in 2004, which is important to note because 
the increased level of regulation on the short-sales does not occur until 2008.  Therefore, most of 
the potential insider trading occurs in the equity market in his data set, which is reflected in 
Anderson et. al.’s results.  Their analysis portrays that family-controlled firms have 17 times the 
amount of abnormal short-sale transactions prior to negative press releases compared to that of 
non-family-owned firms.  Additionally, their examination revealed that family-owned firms were 
six times more likely to exhibit future negative returns from abnormal short-sale activity versus 
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those of nonfamily firms.  As such, Anderson et. al. assert that family-owned firms seem to have 
sizeable issues with information leakages by one or more family members. 
The Modeling of Announcements 
 By nature, some type of announcements are expected, an example of which being 
earnings announcements which are released on a quarterly basis.  Accordingly, investors know 
approximately when these announcements will be made public.  Christophe et. al. (2004) claims 
that while investors may not know the direction of the news – positive or negative – they do in 
fact know that it will be published and released.  Furthermore, Balasubramanian and Palvia 
(2013) provide empirical evidence showing abnormal short interest around regulatory 
announcements.  Finally, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) link abnormal short selling activity to 
lower stock returns (Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009).   
 Unexpected announcements include mergers and acquisitions, analyst 
upgrades/downgrades, the syndicated loan market, and most importantly EPA press releases.  
Since these announcements are quintessentially unpredictable, it becomes easier to track the ebbs 
and flows of insider activities by measuring the volume of investments before the announcement 
and a potential corresponding change in price afterwards.   
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Cao et. al. (2005) study large merger deals to pinpoint potential signals of the presence of 
individuals capitalizing on privileged, insider information.  They find that an increase in the call-
volume imbalance of a merging firm signals that a merge and acquisition has a greater chance of 
succeeding.  These authors calculate and quantify a call-volume imbalance by taking the call 
volume the day of the merging announcement and divide by the same day total call option open 
interest. Consequently, they determine that there is an abnormal spike of short-term call options 
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prior to takeovers, suggesting that investors prematurely expect a significant price movement2.  
Finally, these authors empirically reinforce through multiple regressions that investors are more 
likely to engage in the options market while possessing insider information than shorting firms in 
the stock market.  All of these conclusions emphasize the pattern that investors privy to insider, 
unexpected information will initiate transactions before they become public.   
Analyst Recommendations 
 Christophe et. al. (2004) study short-selling activity for 913 large firms listed on the 
Nasdaq that analysts follow very closely.  Despite having partially skewed results by only 
observing the larger, more established firms in the Nasdaq, they discovers a strong link between 
abnormal short-selling prior to analyst downgrades utilizing a window three days before the 
respective downgrade.  Taking his event study one step further, Christophe et. al. and Desai et. 
al. (2002) are both able to find another correlation between high levels of short interest and 
subsequent negative returns for the ensuing year.  Combining the above two conclusions show 
that investors contributing towards the abnormal short-sales have a much higher chance of 
profiting from such transactions.   
Hedge Funds and the Syndicated Loan Market 
 Massoud et. al. (2011) examine whether there is evidence of abnormal short selling by 
hedge funds prior to loan originations and loan amendments in the banking industry.  They 
utilizes data from 2005-2007, once again before the heightened regulation in the equity market 
starting at the end of 2008.  Massoud et. al. duly note that some hedge funds are quasi-insiders as 
they have access to private information about the performance of borrowing firms around the 
                                                          
2 Selling/writing call options is not discussed here because in order to do so, the insider must possess the 
corresponding number of shares of stock in his/her portfolio or be approved by having a certain level of capital in 
reserve.  Additionally, while Cao makes no reference to put options in his study about mergers, investigating both 
calls and puts will be fleshed out in further detail upon the analysis of my data. 
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time in which a loan can be accepted or denied by the hedge fund.  Prior to 1995, the acceptance 
or denial of a loan was entirely controlled by commercial banks.  Massoud et. al. explain that 
when a hedge fund either grants or denies the loan enactment or continuation, this same firm can 
short the firm with a comparatively higher level of knowledge than other investors in the equity 
market.  As a result, it is unsurprising that hedge funds take advantage of this conflict of interest 
to boost profits.  Specifically, Massoud et. al. determine that the market reacts positively to new 
bank loan announcements with a 1.52% abnormal return, versus the negative market reaction to 
new hedge fund loan announcements via a -1.29% abnormal return.  One possibility for the 
positive/negative difference in abnormal returns for bank loan and hedge fund loan 
announcements, respectively, is that the quasi-insiders of the latter perform actions in the market 
before it is publicly release.   
Concluding Remarks 
 Drawing from the above event studies, they all show evidence of some degree of 
informed or insider trading.  Whether present in the equity market or options market, information 
asymmetries will cause the privileged few to profit at other people’s expense.  In the case of 
unexpected EPA announcements being published, this paper aims to find evidence that insider 
trading may exist in the energy industry.  Consequently, my empirical results will support the 
above evidence that informed options activity is much greater than evidence of short selling 
activity ahead of EPA announcements.   
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Figure 1 
Theory 
 In order for us to determine insider investor expectations and how that affects subsequent 
short-sale and option pricing, we must first discuss the mechanisms behind each relevant market 
action or derivative.  When an investor initiates a short-sale, that individual sells borrowed 
securities while simultaneously agreeing to buy back an equal number of shares at some point in 
the future.  As a result, the short-sale investor is anticipating a decline in the price of such shares 
in the near or long-term future.  The investor’s goal is to buy and return the securities at the 
lower price, while receiving the difference in profit as demonstrated in Figure 1 below3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/shortvsput.asp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Depending on the brokerage firm, amount borrowed, and type of institution executing a short-sale will determine 
whether there is an associated interest charge.  Most brokers do not charge interest, and for extremely large 
amounts, the brokers sometime pay interest to the borrower since when the brokerage firm already puts the 
money gained from the transaction into an interest-bearing account.  Accordingly, it wouldn’t make sense for the 
brokerage firm to charge the customer an additional interest charge. 
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Figure 2 
Returns in the Options Market 
 Depending upon future expectations alongside informational imbalances, an investor 
attracted to the derivatives market has a few choices.  If the investor believes a stock will 
increase in the near or far term, he or she can purchase call options for that particular stock.  A 
call option constitutes an agreement in which the seller – or writer – of an option agrees sell a 
company’s stock at a predetermined price to the buyer of the option for a particular period of 
time if the buyer chooses.  The aforementioned price and date are called a “strike price” and 
“expiration date”, respectively.  The seller expects the market price to remain below the strike 
price and, if correct, the buyer has no incentive to exercise the option to buy the stock.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1053092/000089109213004721/e53788fwp.htm 
 As shown graphically in Figure 2 above, the buyer of the option receives a profit equal to 
the current price of the stock minus the strike price threshold and the option buyer pays a 
“premium” originally paid by the buyer. Upon the market price staying below the strike price, 
the seller will profit equal to the original options price.  The amount of options one purchases 
needs to be ‘exercised’ by the appropriated date if the underlying stock price rises above the 
strike price, or else the initial up-front investment is lost by the buyer and transferred to the 
seller.  The buyer of a call option is betting that the stock price will increase to a certain 
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Figure 3 
threshold before the expiration date.  Thus, a trader would buy a call option if the person 
expected the market value to rise above the strike price by a certain date.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             http://www.cboe.com/learncenter/concepts/basics/index.aspx 
 Alternatively, a put option incorporates the same mechanism described above simply in 
the opposite direction.  Put options can only be exercised – and thus be “in the money” – when 
the underlying stock price falls below the agreed-upon strike price before the options expire.  In 
contrast with the intentions of call option buyers, the holders of put options are wagering that the 
underlying stock price will fall below the strike price during a certain time period.  The seller of 
the put option is expecting that the market price remains above the strike price, in which case the 
seller would profit equal to the up-front investment of the buyer upon expiration.  As shown 
graphically in Figure 3 above, the buyer of the put option expects the market price to fall much 
below the strike price in order to make a subsequent profit equal to market price minus the strike 
price and original price paid for the options.  In the case of EPA announcements conveying 
imminent negative information, insiders holding this information prematurely would likely either 
choose to purchase put options or sell call options if they expected the market to react in 
accordance with the news.   
 Options possess several innate characteristics that make them more attractive for insider 
traders than purchasing shares of stock.  As outlined by Dong and Sinha (2012), options have a 
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higher degree of leverage over taking the long or short position on a stock.  This occurs because 
investors pay lower prices for options relative to those for stocks, but the corresponding payoffs 
are much larger than the payoffs from equity market purchases, ceteris paribus.  Christophe et. 
al. (2004) illustrate that since purchasing options constitutes an all-or-nothing transaction that 
matures at a future date, informed investors have been continually exploiting these benefits, 
especially in the most recent decade.  Additionally, Dong and Sinha argue that options have a 
lower transaction costs than analogous transactions in the equity market.  Since options contracts 
are normally bundled by the hundreds and the initial up-front investment is lower, the 
commission fees are comparably lower for both high volume and frequency traders in the options 
market.  Finally, Donoho (2004) asserts that for the purposes of trying to measure insider trading, 
options with the shortest expiration periods are more attractive than those with longer expiration 
periods.  This is because investors holding asymmetric information aim to maximize profitability 
by making such transactions with a comparatively lower threshold to enter into the money.  
Shorter times to expiration can be better for insider trading because option prices increase with 
time to expiration as there is more time for the option to go into the money.  
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Figure 4 
 
 
 The return potential of several different put options for the same exercise dates and strike 
prices can be illustrated in a simpler example.  As shown in Figure 4, the bid and ask prices 
outline how the cost of options is delivered to investors.  The bid price represents the latest price 
offered by the market to purchase options for a firm.  Whereas the ask price constitutes the latest 
price offered by that same market to sell options of a stock.  The bid-ask spread signifies how 
much commission is generated by the market-making intermediary involved in each transaction.  
Volume is simply quantifies how many options contracts were executed on a given trading day.  
Observing previous market trends demonstrates the fact that options which demonstrate a large 
amount of daily activity will have a narrower bid-ask spread than that of less frequently-traded 
firms.  Open interest portrays the number of options that have been purchased but not yet 
exercised; the open interest will return to 0 once the regimented expiration date set by the 
marketplace ensues.   
 The data in Figure 4 illustrate relevant options data for Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 
(APC) in July of 2013.  Let us assume that an investor has access to material, nonpublic, and 
negative information on July 1st that will become public sometime in the near future, but before 
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July 20th, 2013.  The current price for Anadarko on July 1st is $86.79 per share.  What choices 
does this investor have?  The first choice would be whether to invest in the equity or options 
market.  Both choices will be discussed, but let us initially select the latter.  Because of 
uncertainty concerns of when the information will be released, the investor will likely purchase 
the put option with the expiration date of July 20th.  For example, since options are typically 
bought and sold in hundreds of options, the investor buys 2 bundles of 100 options at a bid price 
of $2.60 on July 1st for the July 20th expiration date.  The total cost for this individual is $520 up-
front.  The investor expects with great certainty that the underlying price of $86.79 will plummet 
quickly once the news is announced.  On July 16th, Anadarko’s stock price drops to $79.79 per 
share.  At this point, the insider has the ability to exercise the 200 options purchased on July 1st.  
Upon exercising the options at this juncture, the price differential between the initial underlying 
price and the current stock price is $86.79 – 79.79 = $7.00 per option.  In other words, if both 
bundles of options are exercise at this time, the profit from such a transaction is (200*$7.00) – 
520 = $880 relative to a $520 initial investment.  Alternatively, the corresponding ask price at 
this time would have increased exponentially, allowing the options to flow to another holder 
expecting the price to decrease even further by the July 20th exercise date if the insider chooses 
this route.   
 If an investor were to short Anadarko utilizing the same $520 up-front cost, the insider 
would have been able to borrow and sell approximately six shares of the company on July 1st.  
Assuming that the investor purchases and returns the shares at the same time as the one did with 
options at $79.79, the corresponding profit would be $7.00*6 = $32.00 relative to a $520 initial 
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investment4.  Both examples do not include commission as the corresponding amounts would 
likely cancel each other out.  This is a paltry profit when compared to the options investor who is 
walking away with nearly $900.00.  A few factors explain this large difference in profit.  First, 
there is significantly higher risk with purchasing options: the $520 options investment could 
have been lost completely if the price remained above the strike price.  Whereas the short seller 
would still have had most of his/her investment and may have been able to capitalize at a later 
point in the future if the underlying share price subsequently decreased.  Second, there is less risk 
for an insider to be caught2 (Christophe et al. 2004).   
EPA-Specific Details 
 Returning to the original premise of predicting insider trading activity within the energy 
industry, it is important to closely observe the intricacies surrounding the EPA citations 
themselves.  Since nearly all options for publicly-traded U.S. firms expire on the same date, the 
timing of the EPA press release in relation to this date is important for insiders.  Furthermore, the 
EPA statement may not be the first time the information concerning the environmental law 
breach is released to the public.  In nearly a third of the firms analyzed, other news sources 
published the information before the EPA statement.  Furthermore, most firms have several 
options available with different expiration dates.  Similarly, another factor that helps isolate 
insider traders exclusively is the timing of the discovery of information.  Since the expiration 
dates for options are the same across the board, the timing influences when the insider would 
execute a transaction.  For example, if an individual found material information eight days prior 
to its scheduled release, yet the expiration date in the options marketplace was going to occur in 
two days, he or she would likely wait until after the two-day mark and sometime before eight 
                                                          
4  The investor could earn interest on the cash in a separate account during the same period.  If the 
interest earned equals the borrowing cost, the transaction would be a wash. 
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days to make the transaction.  Alternatively, an investor could purchase an option with a later 
expiration date depending upon when the information is received by the investor.   
Visibility 
 Another consideration for insider traders is how high can options volume reach before a 
red flag is generated by the SEC?  This question brings us back to the relationship between the 
equity and options market.  Specifically referring to option transactions after 2008, there is a 
comparatively lesser chance of being caught in this time period than in the past because of the 
relative increase in aggregate options activity5.  Dong and Sinha (2012) asset that this shift is 
caused by heightened regulatory involvement in the equity market – including restricting the 
proportion of short to long positions on a firm – that makes the options market a more attractive 
substitute in the wake of the financial crisis.  Currently, there is still a much higher number of 
daily transactions in the stock market versus transactions in the options market.  Therefore, an 
insider holding onto invaluable information would be able to better hide his or her actions in the 
equity market since there is more volume on both sides, which causes a greater level of investor 
uncertainty and divergence of opinion (Miller 1977).  Dong and Sinha note that when certain 
events occur, options activity is highly focused primarily around expected earnings 
announcements as well as unannounced incidents that subsequently affect a firm’s corresponding 
market value.   
 Let us assume that an insider investor receives material, nonpublic information a month 
before it is scheduled to be released to hands of the public.  Additionally, such information in an 
EPA press release or equivalent news source will decrease the value of the underlying stock.  
The investor has several choices for how to best take advantage of such information.  As other 
                                                          
5 After 2008, the comparative risk has increased.  However, in comparison to the equity market, 
the risk is still greater in the options market despite new regulations. 
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authors such as Christophe et. al. (2004) have stated in the past, one choice would be to purchase 
put options with the shortest expiration dates and closest strike prices to their underlying share 
prices that day.  Ceteris paribus, these put options will have the cheapest price when compared to 
puts with longer expiration dates.  Another choice would be to purchase put options with longer 
expiration dates and/or ones that have a strike price farther away from the share price.  This 
medium-risk investor is assuming that after the EPA press release is distributed to the public, the 
corresponding market price will respond more acutely.  As such, the higher the level of risk, the 
greater the potential returns.  Similarly, an alternative investment would be to execute a short-
sale transaction.  Compared to options, short-sales represent the most costly investment up-front, 
but have a long-term value and are more balanced.  There is no one best choice for an insider, 
which is why some investors may choose to blend these investments to balance the associated 
risk and reward for each individual choice.   
Hypotheses: 
 Based on the literature concerning informed and insider trading in the stock and options 
markets, my results will presumably show some evidence of privileged access to material 
information industry-wide.  As such, my first hypothesis is that if there is an EPA violation for 
an energy company, then there can be evidence of informed or insider trading traced by 
heightened levels of short-sale volume or put option activity one or several days prior to the EPA 
press release or the news breaking from another source beforehand.  The intercept value for each 
regression will show whether the model shows evidence of heightened levels of trading in the 
short sale and options market, respectively.  There are many factors that affect the free market 
price of a stock, some of which are both unmeasurable and unquantifiable.  However, a 
significant factor for measuring trading activity for each press release is the magnitude of the 
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penalty for companies of varying market capitalizations.  Thus, my second hypothesis is that the 
relative strength of the EPA monetary penalty has a positive relationship with the level of short-
sale and put option volume.  More specifically, companies that receive larger penalties as a 
percentage of total revenue or total assets will experience greater trading volume around such 
announcements in accordance with the theory behind the Black-Scholes model.  Finally, why 
informed and insider traders act upon such information in the first place is to secure greater 
profits in the future.  My third hypothesis is that companies that exhibit abnormally-high levels 
of short interest and put option activity prior to a negative EPA press release will experience 
abnormally-negative returns in the short term.   
Empirical Analysis 
 In this analysis I determine whether there is evidence of informed or insider trading in the 
energy market before EPA press releases become public.  I utilize two series of regressions: one 
using put option data and the other utilizing short-sale data.  Both of my models measure 
whether heightened levels of trading occur prior to EPA announcements or the news breaking 
into the media.  Before each EPA announcement, I searched Lexis Nexis to see if the information 
contained in each announcement was reported in the news media was released by the EPA.  If so, 
the date the news is reported in the media becomes the new announcement date.  Additionally, 
these models measure whether the size of the penalty to the firm’s revenue abnormally enhances 
trading prior to the announcement.  Finally, I determine whether prior trading activity causes 
abnormal stock returns the day after the announcement.   
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Options Model 
 In my subsequent analysis, I use the following population regression function: 
𝐴𝐵𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑂𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑖  
(1) 
 The primary dependent variable I use to capture trading activity prior to EPA 
announcements called abnormal put option activity (ABPUT).  ABPUT is calculated by taking 
the average put option volume five days prior to the announcement and dividing by the previous 
14-day put option volume average.  This value measures if there is an increase in put option 
volume for each firm directly before the announcement and seeing whether the number changes 
relative to two weeks beforehand.   
 ABPUT is regressed on five independent variables to determine whether these factors 
have an influence on prior put option activity6.  PENTR is the total EPA monetary penalty 
divided by the firm’s total revenue that year.  The total monetary cost is comprised of four parts: 
1) state and federal civil penalties, 2) monetarily-quantified injunctive relief, 3) leak detection 
and repair (LDAR) projects, and 4) environmental mitigation projects.  The civil penalties are 
lump sums that are mandated payments to the EPA, the corresponding state government, or both.  
The injunctive relief comprises the greatest expense to the firm: it demonstrates how much 
capital each firm needs to pay to fix its facilities.  Since the amendments to the CAA and the 
CWA constitute relatively severe changes in emission and wastewater management, the 
injunctive relief is quite expensive.  LDAR systems are similar to injunctive relief; however, they 
focus on preventative measures that facilities need to install to prevent future environmental 
                                                          
6 I tried including a sixth dummy variable to account for sanction news reaching the media before the EPA released 
the news.  However, the variable didn’t prove to be significant and was omitted from the final model. 
Macksoud 23 
 
infractions.  Finally, the environmental mitigation projects require the firm to remedy any 
damage it caused to the atmosphere, nearby water supplies, or anything else.   
 The natural logarithm of the ratio of total monetary penalty divided by the firm’s total 
revenue (LNPENTR) measures the size of the penalty compared to the firm’s total revenue.  
Since the range of values of PENTR is quite high and skewed right as shown statistically in 
Table 8, the natural logarithm of these values were computed in order compress this range.  
Since the mean value of PENTR – 9.258 – is significantly larger than its median value of 0.0371, 
the PENTR values are skewed right.  As such, the natural logarithm values for the 35 firms are 
captured in the LNPENTR variable, and this variable is used in the subsequent analysis.  
Consequently, I expect the coefficient to have a positive value because as the penalty rises 
relative to revenue, there should be more of an impact on the firm’s profitability.  Ceteris 
paribus, I would expect an increase in abnormal trading and thus an increase in ABPUT.   
 The Non-Monetary Penalty Expenditure Scale (NMPES) measures the non-quantifiable 
expenses incurred by the EPA-violated firm.  Because of the variation in cases and penalties, 
NMPES has a range from zero to five in the regressions below.  As the value of NMPES 
becomes lower, there is consequently a lesser degree of a non-monetary penalty incurred by the 
firm.  Conversely, higher NMPES values indicate higher non-monetary penalties.  NMPES 
equals zero when there are no non-monetary expenses incurred by the firm.  NMPES equals one 
when non-monetary expenses are accounted for partially with the inclusion of both 
environmental mitigation and LDAR charges quantified in the EPA press release.  NMPES 
equals two when non-monetary expenses are accounted for partially, including lower-end 
environmental mitigation projects.  NMPES equals three when non-monetary expenses are 
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accounted for partially, including higher-end environmental mitigation projects.7  NMPES equals 
four when non-monetary expenses are accounted for partially when environmental mitigation 
projects are not included.  NMPES equals five when non-monetary expenses are not accounted 
for entirely in the press release.  I expect the coefficient of NMPES to be positive because higher 
NMPES values indicate that a firm needs to fix more issues with its facilities.  Accordingly, with 
more to fix the penalty would carry relatively more weight than the other penalties in the study 
and thus would be traded more frequently by insiders, ceteris paribus. 
 The next two variables are independent variables that capture certain options market 
characteristics.  The first variable is open interest (OI) which is calculated by taking the percent 
change in open interest in put options the day of the announcement and dividing it by that same 
value twenty days prior to the announcement.  Open interest is the number of options that have 
been purchased but not yet exercised; the open interest will return to zero on an options 
expiration date.  I would expect this coefficient value to be positive because I would expect 
informed investors to have greater knowledge of particular put option contracts the day of the 
announcement versus twenty days beforehand.  This is because if these investors predicted 
correctly, they would be able to execute their options at this time if the market moved in the 
predicted direction.   
 The other independent variable is call-put imbalance ratio (CP_IMBAL).  This value 
measures the total call option activity in relation to the total put option activity one day prior to 
the announcement.  I would expect the majority of firms to have a CP_IMBAL less than one 
because if the news is pertinent and leaked ahead of time to privileged investors, these 
individuals are much more likely than not to purchase put options than call options for the firm.  
                                                          
7 The distinction between lower and higher end environmental mitigation projects is quantified as follows: lower 
end when the expense is at or less than ten percent of the injunctive relief expense, and higher end when the 
expense is greater than ten percent of the injunctive relief expense. 
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As Donoho (2004) mentions in his event study analysis,  more calls than puts indicates optimism 
in the firm, whereas more puts than calls induces market pessimism.  Consequently, since this 
value is lagged for the day before each announcement, more puts than calls would indicate short-
run negativity towards the firm and thus insiders alike are likely to purchase more put options.   
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the impact of the data leakage would cause more puts to be traded 
than calls, bringing the coefficient below a 1:1 ratio.  As such, I would expect the coefficient for 
CP_IMBAL to be negative because as the ratio of calls to puts increases, then abnormal put 
option would likely decrease to a value below one. 
 The final variable in the population regression function is the abnormal returns for each 
firm’s stock on the day after the announcement.  This variable (ABRETSP) is derived by 
creating a predicted value for each firm’s stock return and then subtracting the stock’s observed 
return.  Each stock’s predicted return is calculated as follows: I regress the stock’s daily returns 
on the S&P 500’s daily returns using data for 120 days prior to and including the announcement 
and obtain an estimate for the market beta and intercept term.  Ceteris paribus, assuming perfect 
foresight of the investor, I would expect ABRETSP’s coefficient to be negative because if the 
news is surprisingly bad to informed investors, abnormal returns will be negative.  These 
informed investors would show their viewpoints by purchasing put options and engaging in short 
sale activity.  This high pre-announcement short sale activity should correspond with negative 
post-announcement abnormal returns, yielding a negative coefficient for the model.  Anderson, 
Reeb, and Zhao (2012) affirm this stance by showing in their study concerning family ownership 
in firms that abnormal prior levels of trading activity leads to a higher degree of abnormally 
negative returns.   
Macksoud 26 
 
 I considered using other forms of ABPUT in my analysis.  The variables and associated 
summary statistics are shown in Table 2 as ABPUT2 and ABPUT3 and are used as robustness 
checks for the primary model.  The two above variables are calculated by taking the average of 
several underlying variables to be described below.  TOTPUT0 is the total put option volume the 
day of the announcement divided by its previous 14-day average.  TOTPUT1 is the total put 
option volume the day before the announcement divided by the previous 14-day average.  
TOTPUT2 through TOTPUT5 measure the total put option volume two to five days prior to the 
announcement and are divided by their previous 14-day averages.  Consequently, ABPUT2 is 
calculated by taking the average of TOTPUT0 through TOTPUT5, which is a combined total of 
six numbers.  ABPUT3 is similar to ABPUT2 except it excludes TOTPUT0.  In other words, 
ABPUT3 is calculated by taking the average of TOTPUT1 through TOTPUT5.   
 ABPUT is the optimal dependent variable because out of the three dependent variables, it 
incorporates the largest amount of market data.  Additionally, since the exact timing of the EPA 
press releases is not publicly available, it is important to utilize a dependent variable that does 
not encompass intra-day data.   
Data Description: Options Model 
 The data in Table 2 were collected from a variety of sources.  The raw data behind the 
variables containing options data are from Delta Neutral.  The data that involve total revenue are 
from Mergent Online.  The monetary cost of the EPA penalties along with the non-monetary data 
related to each press release was determined from press releases posted on the EPA’s website.  
Finally, the market data for the abnormal returns variable is from Yahoo.com. 
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 The data take into account 35 firm-specific violations of legislative statutes regulated by 
the EPA.8  I reached this final sample size because it encompasses all of the EPA violations for 
electric, natural gas, and oil companies of publicly traded firms from 2008 to 2014.  
Additionally, it was not necessary to go farther back than 2008 because strict amendments to the 
CAA and the CWA were enacted in the early 2000’s.  The EPA started to prosecute firms 
relating these statutes in 2003.  However, it wasn’t until the beginning of 2008 when a publicly 
traded company was cited for an energy-related infraction.   
 ABPUT has a mean of 1.2230 with a standard deviation of 1.2166.  Since the maximum 
value of 6.5623 is more than three standard deviations away from the mean, it shows that at least 
one outlier is present.   
 LNPENTR possesses a mean of -2.7004 with a standard deviation of 3.4253.  Since the 
minimum and maximum values of this variable are -7.4906 and 4.4817, respectively, the natural 
logarithm condensed the previously skewed PENTR values effectively.  OI has a mean of 
5.6264% with a standard deviation of 43.9524%.  This variable contains one or more outliers in 
the upper end as there is one that has a OI of 210.7542%, showing that open interest for put 
options changed tremendously the day of the announcement.  Finally, it is also worth noting that 
the mean value for ABRETSP is quite low at a value of .0648% with a standard deviation of 
1.1935%.  As such, the 35 firms on average did not suffer great loss accounting for market forces 
the day after the announcement.   
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Originally, there were 37 firms in the data set.  However, two of the firm’s possessed a severely high call-put 
imbalance ratio, and therefore were removed because there is no anticipation of a stock price decline with 
extremely high levels of CP_IMBAL. 
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Empirical Results: Options Model 
 The subsequent analysis assesses whether there is abnormal put option activity prior to 
EPA press releases and what variables are associated with that activity.  Results are presented in 
Table 3 below.   
 Using a 10% level of significance, the only two variables that are statistically significant 
in the put options regression are the intercept term and ABRETSP.  Since the sign is positive for 
the intercept variable, it affirms hypothesis one for options: there is evidence of abnormally high 
trading ahead of news of EPA sanctions for energy firms.  Additionally, since both LNPENTR 
and NMPES are statistically insignificant, the relative strength of the monetary and non-
monetary components of the EPA penalty does not cause previous abnormal levels of trading.  
As such, there is no proof in this model affirming my second hypothesis.   
 Finally, ABRETSP is negative in the model which matches its expected sign and is 
statistically significant under the 10% aforementioned level above.  Consequently, ceteris 
paribus, a one percentage point increase in abnormal returns is associated with a 31.95% 
percentage point decrease in ABPUT.  My model outlined above affirms my third hypothesis 
concerning the link between prior abnormal put option activity and subsequently abnormally 
negative returns. 
 I estimated the second regression model using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model.  16.30% of the variation in abnormal put option activity is explained by the model.  This 
value shows that the model is moderately poor at predicting abnormal put option activity.  Given 
an F-value of 1.13 with a corresponding p-value of 0.3670, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
all of the coefficients for the independent variables are equal to zero.  Therefore, the R-square 
value isn’t the optimal measurement of abnormal put option activity prior to each announcement.  
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Using a 10% level of significance, two of the independent variables prove to be statistically 
significant.  However, the model taken as a whole is not a reliable predictor of abnormal put 
option activity prior to EPA announcements.   
Remedies for Gauss-Markov Violations to Maintain OLS: Options Model 
 In order for the model to be the best estimator to determine abnormal put option activity, 
severe multicollinearity between two or more variables cannot exist.  While extreme 
multicollinearity is not an issue with the model below in Table 3, I ensure that a high degree of 
multicollinearity is not present. There are no Pearson Correlations above 0.8 for any two 
variables.  Furthermore, the individual variance inflations for none of the independent variables 
exceed the VIF threshold of 1.19 for the model.  Moreover, the collinearity index shows no 
evidence of severe or even moderate multicollinearity as their corresponding condition index 
values are all significantly below 10.  Since all three tests showed no signs of multicollinearity, 
we can confidently conclude that it is not an issue in the model. 
 The maintenance of OLS also requires no evidence of heteroskedasticity.  Since there is a 
relatively narrow range of values for the dependent variable – ranging from 0.19 to 6.56 – I do 
not expect heteroskedasticity cause overconfidence in the subsequent t & p values.  I utilize the 
Breusch-Pagan test in order to determine whether heteroskedasticity poses in an issue in the 
options model.  The test results for the Breusch-Pagan test are portrayed in Table 4.  Since the 
one-tailed p-value for the entire model is 0.2906, or 29.06%, it falls above the 10% level of 
significance.  Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that all of the independent variable 
coefficients equal zero and conclude that heteroskedasticity does not significantly affect the 
standard error estimates.   
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 Finally, Anderson (2012), Diether (2009), and Christophe (2010) all test if exogenous 
factors to their respective models influence their set of independent variables.  All three analyses 
find that exogenous factors not quantified in their models have a very little impact on their 
results.  Since my models extract concepts from all three of author’s models listed above, I can 
conclude that exogeneity does not heavily influence my results and thus my model maintains its 
OLS status.   
Short-sale Model 
 In my subsequent analysis below, I use the following population regression function: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐵𝑇𝑀 +  𝛽7𝑆𝑅𝑉 +  𝛽8𝑀𝑂𝑀 
(2) 
 The primary dependent variable I use to capture trading activity prior to EPA 
announcements in this model is called abnormal short interest (ABSHORT).  The first step in 
calculating the dependent variable is to get a measure of short sale activity.  Short interest is 
defined as the total short-sale volume and dividing it by the total amount of trading activity in the 
equity market.  The second step is to estimate the activity prior to the announcement.  Thus, 
TOTSHORT0 is found by taking the total short interest the day of the announcement and 
dividing it by the previous 14-day average.  TOTSHORT1 takes the total short interest the day 
before the announcement and divides this number by its previous 14-day average.  TOTSHORT2 
through TOTSHORT5 are calculated by taking the average short-sale volume two to five days 
before the announcement and dividing that number by their previous 14-day averages.  
Consequently, ABSHORT takes the average of TOTSHORT1 through TOTSHORT5.   
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 As shown in regression function above, there are some variables that have been 
previously described in the options model and others that have been added specifically to this 
model.  LNPENTR, NMPES, and ABRETSP are all calculated identically as they were in the 
options model.  The sign expectations also remain the same throughout the short-sale regression 
analysis. 
 MKTCAPSM and MKTCAPMED are both dummy variables that capture the market 
capitalization of all 36 firms.  MKTCAPSM is 1 when the firm has a total market capitalization 
of $2 billion or below (a small firm), and zero otherwise.  Similarly, MKTCAPMED is one when 
the firm has a total market capitalization between $2 billion and $10 billion (a medium-sized 
firm), and zero otherwise.  Both MKTCAPSM and MKTCAPMED would have positive 
coefficients because small and medium capitalization firms have less working capital than large 
capitalization firms.  More often than not, large capitalization firms own the entire modicum of 
the production of power from harvesting the source to delivering the refined form to the 
consumer.  Thus, these firms are more likely to withstand an EPA penalty and will suffer less 
from insider trading activity relative to that of smaller firms.  Conversely, small and medium 
capitalization firms generally do not possess these characteristics, and – independent of how 
expensive the penalty is in relation to revenue – bad press generated from such events will have a 
greater impact on abnormal short interest on smaller firms.   
 BTM is the ratio of the firm’s book value to its corresponding market value.  Both values 
were gathered and analyzed as of December 31st, 2014.  I expect the coefficient for BTM to be 
negative or close to zero because as a firm’s BTM decreases, it becomes either closer to a growth 
stock or a more extreme one.  Investors are expecting growth in divergent directions, which 
increases investor uncertainty and level of short interest.  SRV is found by calculating the 
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standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns 120 days prior to the announcement until 10 days 
prior to the announcement.  The expected sign for SRV is positive because an increase in the 
firm’s price volatility would subsequently cause an increase in divergence of opinion.  The 
investors on the negative side demonstrate their forecasts by shorting the firm, resulting in a 
higher level of short interest.  Similarly, MOM is determined utilizing this same period by 
calculating each firm’s cumulative rate of return and subtracting that of the S&P 500.  I would 
expect MOM to have a negative sign because if the firm’s rate of return is consistently higher 
than the market’s return, this constitutes a buy signal for traditional investors.  In accordance 
with Carhart (1997) as an extension of the Fama-French Model for predicting returns in the 
market, there is a tendency for firms with positive past returns to produce positive future returns.  
Because of this market trend, firms with high momentum will likely have lower short volume 
and interest prior to the announcement, ceteris paribus.   
 I considered using varied forms of the dependent variable for my regression analysis.  
They are shown in Table 5 as ABSHORT2 and ABSHORT3 and are used as robustness checks 
for the primary model.  ABSHORT2 takes the average of TOTSHORT0 through TOTSHORT5.  
Whereas ABSHORT3 takes the average short-sale volume five days prior to the announcement 
and divides it by the previous 14-day short-sale volume average.   
 ABSHORT is preferred over the other two dependent variables.  From a theoretical 
perspective, ABSHORT is the best measurement of abnormal short-sale activity because while 
ABSHORT3 contains a larger amount of market data, the averages comprising ABSHORT are 
more relevant to tracking total market activity than those of ABSHORT3.  Taking the trailing 14-
day averages of short interest in ABSHORT versus taking previous changes in volume constitute 
a more comprehensive measurement of overall market activity versus just isolating short-sale 
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volume without controlling for total market volume.  Additionally, ABSHORT2 contains 
intraday data which we cannot control for in the model below due to data limitations on exactly 
when the EPA released its announcements.  
Data Description: Short-sale Model 
 All of the data in Table 5 were collected from a variety of sources.  All of the variables 
using underlying short-sale data come from the Bats Global Market Exchange.  The variables 
containing information pertaining to market capitalization and return volatility stem from 
underlying data gathered from Yahoo.com.   
 The data take into account 36 violations of environmental legislative statutes regulated by 
the EPA.9  As mentioned above, this includes all of the cases where publicly traded companies 
breached energy-related statutes from the beginning of 2008 through the end of 2014.   
 ABSHORT possesses a mean of 1.00136 with a standard deviation of 13.59336%.  The 
number ranges from 0.74075 to 1.37604, showing that there aren’t any particularly extreme 
values for this dependent variable.  The average value for BTM is 0.73704 with a standard 
deviation of 78.68751%.  One firm to note for BTM is AK Steel Holdings (AKS), which had a 
negative book value as of December 31st, 2014.  This is why the minimum value for BTM is -
.60435.  The firms’ average MOM is negative at a value of -0.01647 with a standard deviation 
26.258%.  This shows that on average, the 36 energy firms underperformed relative to the market 
four months prior to the announcement up until ten days beforehand.  Finally, SRV has a mean 
of 2.10051% with a standard deviation of 1.51918%.  HollyFrontier Corp (HFC) possesses the 
highest SRV of 7.19497%, and it also possesses the highest ABSHORT2 value of  1.3816971, 
                                                          
9 One additional case was added to the sample because since CP_IMBAL is not one of the independent variables in 
the short-sale model, it is able to be included. 
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showing that greater stock price volatility is aligned with a greater degree of short interest for 
HFC.   
 
 
Empirical Results: Short Interest Model 
 The subsequent analysis assesses whether there is abnormal short interest activity prior to 
EPA press releases and what variables are associated with that activity.  Results are presented in 
Table 6 below.   
 Using a 10% level of significance, the only two variables that are statistically significant 
in the put options regression are the intercept term and MKTCAPSM.  However, since the 
coefficient value for the intercept is less than one, it does not affirm hypothesis one for short 
interest.  Therefore, there is no evidence of abnormally high trading ahead of news of EPA 
sanctions for energy firms.  Additionally, since both LNPENTR and NMPES still remain 
statistically insignificant, the relative strength of the monetary and non-monetary components of 
the EPA penalty does not cause previous abnormal levels of trading.  As such, there is no proof 
in the short interest model affirming my second hypothesis.   
 MKTCAPSM has an individual p-value of 10.47%.  For the purposes of my analysis, I 
am considering this value to be close enough to the 10% level of significance needed to analyze 
further.  Additionally, the expected positive sign matches the positive sign on the MKTCAPSM 
coefficient of 0.14.  Therefore, ceteris paribus, having a market capitalization below $2 billion 
increases abnormal short interest by 0.14 percentage points.   
 In contrast to the options model, ABRETSP is statistically insignificant.  However, this 
conclusion contrasts what has been empirically proven in other similar models, such as the one 
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produced by Anderson (2012) and Diether (2009).  More specifically, they assert that abnormal 
short volume and interest prior to an announcement procures abnormally negative returns.  One 
possible explanation for the contradiction could be that the market corrected itself the day of the 
announcement and not the day after, depending upon when time of day the announcement was 
released.  An alternative explanation is that these announcements do not negatively impact stock 
prices as much as expected.   
 The model explains 27.24% of the variation in abnormal short interest.  Additionally, the 
model has an F-value of 1.26 with a corresponding p-value of 0.3027.  Thus, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that all of the coefficients for the independent variables are statistically 
significantly different than zero, and conclude that the R-square listed above is not the best 
predictor for the model.  One independent variable in the short-sale model –MKTCAPSM – 
provides a decent indicator of abnormal short interest prior to EPA announcements.  However, 
the adjusted R-square value of 5.69% shows that many variables in the model do not have a great 
impact on the degree of short interest for each firm.   
Remedies for Gauss-Markov Violations to Maintain OLS: Short Sale Model 
 In order to ensure that the above short-sale model is best estimator for short interest, OLS 
assumptions need to be upheld.  Addressing the presence of severe multicollinearity, none of the 
pairwise Pearson Correlations between two independent variables are above the 0.8 threshold.  
However, the individual variance inflations for three of the independent variables – LNPENTR, 
MKTCAPSM, and SRV – exceed the VIF threshold of 1.37 for the model.  Nevertheless, the 
collinearity index shows no evidence of severe or even moderate multicollinearity as their 
corresponding condition index values are all below 7.  Since two out of the three tests showed no 
signs of severe multicollinearity, I conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue in the model. 
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 The maintenance of OLS also requires no evidence of heteroskedasticity.  Since there is a 
relatively narrow range of values for the dependent variable – ranging from 0.74 to 1.38 – 
heteroskedasticity is presumably not an issue.  I utilized the Breusch-Pagan test in order to 
determine whether heteroskedasticity poses an OLS issue in the short-sale model.  The test 
results for the Breusch-Pagan test are portrayed in Table 7.  Since the one-tailed P-value for the 
entire model is 0.3196, or 31.96%, it falls above our 10% level of significance.  Therefore, I fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that all of the independent variable coefficients equal zero and can 
conclude that heteroskedasticity does not exist in the short-sale model.   
Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 The intercept from the options model indicates elevated put option trading ahead of EPA 
and related announcements, while the intercept from the short interest model indicates no 
difference in short sale activity ahead of such announcements.  Nevertheless, both the options 
and short-sale models produce unpersuasive results that the independent variables outlined above 
have a great influence on abnormal levels of trading activity before the announcements.  In fact, 
the presence of informed trading seems to have more of an influence in the equity market, if 
present at all.  This finding contradicts recent findings by Dong and Sinha (2012) as well as 
others determining a movement of informed trading from the equity to the options market after 
2008.   
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Variable Description
ABPUT Abnormal put option activity 1: average of TOTPUT0 through TOTPUT5
ABPUT2 Abnormal put option activity 2: average of TOTPUT1 through TOTPUT5
ABPUT3 Abnormal put option activity 3: average put option volume five days prior to announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTPUT0 Total put option volume the day of the annoucement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTPUT1 Total put option volume the day before annoucement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTPUT2 Total put option volume two days before annoucement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTPUT3 Total put option volume three days before annoucement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTPUT4 Total put option volume four days before annoucement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTPUT5 Total put option volume five days before annoucement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
PENTR Total EPA monetary penalty divided by the firm's total revenue, percent form
LNPENTR The natural logarithmic values of PENTR 
NMPES Non-monetary penalty expenditure scale
OI Percent change in open interest on the day of the announcement from twenty days prior, percent form
CP_IMBAL Total call option volume divided by the total put option volume one day before the announcement, percent form
ABRETSP Abnormal stock return day after the announcement, percent form
ABSHORT0 Abnormal short sales 1: average of TOTSHORT0 through TOTSHORT5
ABSHORT2 Abnormal short sales 2: average of TOTSHORT1 through TOTSHORT5
ABSHORT3 Abnormal short sales 3: average short sale volume five days prior to announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
SHORTINTEREST Totlal short sale volume divided by total share volume
TOTSHORT0 Total short interest the day of the announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTSHORT1 Total short interest one day before the announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTSHORT2 Total short interest two days before the announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTSHORT3 Total short interest three days before the announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTSHORT4 Total short interest four days before the announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
TOTSHORT5 Total short interest five days before the announcement divided by its previous 14-day moving average
MKTCAPSM Dummy variable, 1 if firm has below $2 million in market capitalization, one year lag
MKTCAPMED Dummy variable, 1 if firm has between $2 million and $10 million in market capitalization, one year lag
BTM Book to market ratio
MOM Momentum of rate of return
SRV Stock return volatility
RESBP2OP Residuals squared value of ABPUT3
RESBP2SI Residuals squared value of ABSHORT2
Appendix: 
Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
ABPUT 35 1.23 1.2166 0.1878 6.5626
ABPUT2 35 1.1557 0.9185 0.2103 4.742
ABPUT3 35 1.1195 0.761 0.2735 3.9773
TOTPUT0 35 0.9385 0.6606 0 3.5349
TOTPUT1 35 0.9725 1.0493 0 5.7512
TOTPUT2 35 1.2599 2.0523 0 10.7487
TOTPUT3 35 1.171 1.379 0 7.3545
TOTPUT4 35 0.9728 0.9647 0 5.7635
TOTPUT5 35 1.4022 2.2929 0 12.5676
PENTR 35 6.399 19.5597 0.0006 88.3844
LNPENTR 35 -2.7 3.4253 -7.4906 4.4817
NMPES 35 2.4286 1.8987 0 -5
OI 35 0.0563 0.4395 -0.6798 2.1075
CP_IMBAL 35 2.1171 2.5646 0 13.1178
ABRETSP 35 -7E-04 0.0121 -0.0301 0.0318
Options Summary Statistics
Table 2: Put Option Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Variables are defined in Table 1.   
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Dependent Variable ABPUT
Number of Observations 35
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Value P-Value
Intercept 1.1765 2.72 0.0109
LNPENTR -0.0831 -1.32 0.1962
NMPES -0.0492 -0.44 0.6608
OI -0.0713 -0.14 0.8866
CP_IMBAL -0.0322 -0.39 0.6969
ABRETSP -31.9484 -1.82 0.0786
F-Value 1.13
Pr > F 0.367
R-Square 0.163
Adj R-Square 0.0187
Options Regression
Table 3: Put Option Model: OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are as in Table 1.  Columns 1-2 outline the variables and coefficient 
estimates for the Abnormal Put Option Activity (ABPUT3) OLS model.  Columns 3-4 portray 
the coefficient estimates’ corresponding P & T values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macksoud 40 
 
Dependent Variable RESBP2OP
Number of Observations 35
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Value P-Value
Intercept 1.6772 1.19 0.244
LNPENTR -0.3258 -1.58 0.1257
NMPES -0.4814 -1.33 0.1948
OI -2.3488 -1.44 0.1588
CP_IMBAL 0.0404 0.15 0.8815
ABRETSP -105.1255 -2.66 0.0125
F-Value 1.3
Pr > F 0.2906
R-Square 0.1482
Adj R-Square 0.0346
Options Heteroskedasticity Test
Table 4: Put Option Test For Heteroskedasticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are as in Table 1.  Columns 1-2 outline the variables and coefficient 
estimates for the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to maintain OLS for the options 
regression shown in Table 3.  Columns 3-4 portray the coefficient estimates’ corresponding P & 
T values. 
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
ABSHORT 36 1.0014 0.1359 0.7406 1.3817
ABSHORT2 36 1.012 0.1312 0.7407 1.376
ABSHORT3 36 1.0011 0.1601 0.6924 1.357
TOTSHORT0 36 1.0655 0.2079 0.5743 1.539
TOTSHORT1 36 1.0439 0.2128 0.7125 1.556
TOTSHORT2 36 1.0072 0.192 0.6943 1.4714
TOTSHORT3 36 0.987 0.2199 0.4826 1.5686
TOTSHORT4 36 0.9876 0.2353 0.5443 1.6323
TOTSHORT5 36 0.9811 0.207 0.3952 1.4027
PENTR 36 6.2213 19.3077 0.0006 88.3844
LNPENTR 36 -2.7097 3.3732 -7.4906 4.4817
NMPES 36 2.4444 1.8738 0 5
ABRETSP 36 -0.0002 0.0128 -0.0302 0.0318
MKTCAPSM 36 0.1667 0.378 0 1
MKTCAPMED 36 0.2222 0.4216 0 1
BTM 36 0.737 0.7869 -0.6043 4.3674
MOM 36 -0.0165 0.2626 -1.027 0.6323
SRV 36 0.021 0.0152 0.007 0.0719
Short Sale Summary Statistics
Table 5: Short Interest Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variables are defined in Table 1.   
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Short Interest Regression: OLS 
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Dependent Variable ABSHORT
Number of Observations 36
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Value P-Value
Intercept 0.9984 16.11 0.0001
LNPENTR -0.0006 -0.07 0.9459
NMPES -0.0144 -1.16 0.2551
ABRETSP 0.8338 0.44 0.6627
MKTCAPSM 0.1414 1.68 0.1047
MKTCAPMED 0.0041 0.07 0.9447
BTM 0.0328 0.85 0.4011
MOM 0.101 1.02 0.3186
SRV -0.4788 -0.23 0.8228
F-Value 1.26
Pr > F 0.3027
R-Square 0.2724
Adj R-Square 0.0569
Short Interest Regression
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are as in Table 1.  Columns 1-2 outline the variables and coefficient 
estimates for the Abnormal Short Sales (ABSHORT2) OLS model.  Columns 3-4 portray the 
coefficient estimates’ corresponding P & T values. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Short Interest Test For Heteroskedasticity 
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Dependent Variable RESBP2SI
Number of Observations 36
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Value P-Value
Intercept 0.0158 1.96 0.0603
LNPENTR -0.001 -0.92 0.3645
NMPES -0.0021 -1.27 0.2146
ABRETSP 0.6287 2.55 0.0166
MKTCAPSM -0.0017 -0.15 0.8789
MKTCAPMED -0.0059 -0.78 0.4429
BTM 0.0043 0.87 0.3934
MOM 0.0128 0.99 0.331
SRV -0.079 -0.29 0.7767
F-Value 1.23
Pr > F 0.3196
R-Square 0.2672
Adj R-Square 0.05
Short Interest Heteroskedasticity Test
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are as in Table 1.  Columns 1-2 outline the variables and coefficient 
estimates for the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to maintain OLS for the short interest 
regression shown in Table 6.  Columns 3-4 portray the coefficient estimates’ corresponding P & 
T values. 
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Variable PENTR
Number of Observations 41
Mean 9.2581
Std Deviation 24.0648
Kurtosis 5.5694
Skewness 2.6122
Median 0.0371
Mode 0.001
Range 88.3838
IQR 0.6728
Quantile Estimate
100% Max 88.3844
99% 88.3844
95% 66.5249
90% 44.5637
75% Q3 0.6774
50% Median 0.0371
25% Q1 0.0046
10% 0.001
5% 0.001
1% 0.0006
0% Min 0.0006
PENTR Skewness Test
Table 8: Skewness Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variables are 
defined in Table 1.   
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